












The difficulties faced by many developing countries in raising revenue from direct taxes 
have forced them to rely heavily on indirect taxes to finance development interventions.  
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how to identify socially desirable options for 
commodity taxation in the context of a poverty reduction strategy.  Within the logic of 
social evaluation the author assesses tax options on the basis of value judgments 
underlying members of the additively separable class of poverty measures.  The criterion 
hinges on both the pattern of consumption of each commodity and the price elasticity of 
the poverty measure used.  An application of this methodology to data for Guinea shows 
that many components of food expenditure (particularly cereals, grains and roots) would 
be good candidates for exemption from VAT.  Even though expenditure on health and 
education is distributed in favor of the non-poor, their importance for human capital 
development argues for a program of targeted subsidies in a broader context of cost 
recovery. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
It is commonly believed that maintaining and improving the living standard of a 
population is the ultimate objective of public policy and a fundamental expectation of the 
governed (Sen et al. 1987).  Every policymaker should therefore strive to make people 
capable of choosing to live well.  This Aristotelian view of the world underscores the 
importance of public finance for development.  Indeed, the pursuit of this basic policy 
goal entails raising revenue and reallocating it to potential beneficiaries through public 
spending.  Furthermore, the way public spending is financed and allocated is bound to 
affect the behavior of socioeconomic agents and the distribution of economic welfare 
within society (World Bank 1988). 
Developing countries confront a host of macroeconomic challenges in the design 
and implementation of development strategies and policies.  These challenges often stem 
from a poor policy response to exogenous shocks or from careless fiscal and monetary 
policies.  In the 1980s and much of the 1990s, developing countries experienced a severe 
economic crisis linked to the two oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979, and the sharp 
decline in the world price of non-oil commodities between 1980 and 1987.  These shocks 
left many countries saddled with unsustainable imbalances in terms of current account 
deficits, excessive debt and fiscal deficits.  The crisis also brought fiscal adjustment to the 
forefront of the development agenda.  Such an adjustment entails a modification in the 
way the public sector raises resources from the private sector through taxes or charges on 
current or future economic activities, and redistributes these resources in the form of 
public spending.   2
Ultimately, public spending is constrained by the ability of the tax system to 
produce revenue beyond what may be available from other sources.  When faced with 
mounting budget deficits after significant expenditure cuts, many developing countries 
have had to reform their tax systems to increase revenue.  This invariably entails a 
restructuring of the tax base and a modification of rates.  This side of fiscal adjustment is 
the focus of our paper with particular emphasis on the reform of commodity taxation.  
This emphasis stems from the fact that developing countries have serious difficulties 
raising revenue from direct taxes on individuals and firms due to the fact that many 
potentially taxable transactions take place in a sizable informal sector of the economy.  
These countries are thus forced to rely heavily on indirect taxes on goods and non-factor 
services (such as sales, excise, and value added taxes)
1.  It is estimated that developing 
countries derive about 40 percent of their tax revenue from indirect taxes and 25 percent 
from income tax (Keen and Simone 2004).  Over time, there has also been a significant 
shift from trade to domestic taxes as a result of the process of trade liberalization.   
Finally, in the 1990s, many developing countries adopted the value-added tax or VAT as 
a preferred means to tax consumption. 
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how to identify socially desirable options 
for commodity taxation in the context of a poverty reduction strategy.  The perspective of 
development as empowerment has prompted the international community to declare 
poverty eradication a basic objective of development and therefore a benchmark measure 
                                                 
1 Indirect or commodity taxes generally include taxes on domestic production and consumption, and on 
international trade.  Production taxes are placed on goods before they enter the distribution chain while 
consumption taxes are levied on the sale of final goods only (World Bank 1988).  A pure consumption tax 
is levied at the retail stage for all domestically consumed goods whether imported or produced locally.  The 
value added tax or VAT is applicable to all transactions within the production-distribution chain all the way 
to the retail point.  However, all intermediate purchasers can claim taxes paid against taxes due on sales.  
This is what makes the VAT a commodity tax on consumption (the final purchaser has no way to 
recuperate the amount paid in taxes).   3
of the performance of socioeconomic systems.  In this context, poverty must be seen as 
the deprivation of basic capabilities to lead the kind of life that one has reason to value 
(Sen 1999).  A well designed and implemented public finance policy can therefore be a 
powerful tool for promoting poverty-reducing economic growth. 
  We frame our approach within the logic of social impact analysis understood as 
an assessment of variations in individual and social welfare attributable to the 
implementation of a policy.  We maintain that, the observed poverty in a given society 
depends fundamentally on individual behavior and endowments (internal e.g. will and 
ability, and external such as ownership of assets and access to social support), and the 
socio-political arrangements that govern social interaction.  We can therefore restate the 
focal policy problem as one of restructuring a system of indirect taxes to maintain or 
increase yield, reduce distortions and minimize the burden on the poor.  This is basically 
a problem of optimal commodity taxation, the solution of which falls within the 
normative approach to policymaking which seeks to maximize a social welfare function 
subject to the economy’s resource, technology and institutional constraints (Dixit 1996, 
Diamond and Mirrlees 1971a, b). 
  To identify desirable changes from the status quo, we need to compute the 
consequences of the policy reform and use explicit value judgments to assess these 
consequences.  This is the standard approach underlying the modern theory of tax reform 
(Newbery and Stern 1987).  Within this general framework, the computation of 
individual gains or losses relies on two basic assumptions: (1) the principle of 
optimization  is used to characterize individual behavior, and (2) competitive markets   4
govern interactions
2 among socioeconomic agents.  The optimal behavior of a 
socioeconomic agent is represented by a maximum value function (e.g. indirect utility) 
indicating the maximum value of the (individual) objective function in terms of various 
parameters underpinning the optimization problem (e.g. prices and the fixed budget).   
One can then invoke the envelope theorem to calculate the impact of changes in these 
parameters on the objective function (Dixit 1990). 
  In the public finance tradition (Drèze and Stern 1987, Newbery and Stern 1987, 
Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2001, Yitzhaki 2003), social desirability of a policy is judged on 
the basis of the variation of a social welfare function with respect to changes in individual 
utility functions induced by changes in policy instruments.  This function is usually 
assumed to be a member of the Bergson-Samuelson family where social welfare is 
defined in terms of individual (indirect) utility functions.  Thus the social impact of a 
policy change depends on the specification of this function on the basis of a set of value 
judgments. 
  The poverty focus of this paper requires a social evaluation criterion that pays 
special attention to the outcomes of the poor.  We therefore base the assessment on 
poverty measures satisfying Sen’s focus axiom.  These measures are invariant with 
respect to the welfare of the non-poor (Sen 1997).  In other words, evaluation is 
conducted on basis of a truncated distribution of outcomes.  Truncation occurs at the 
poverty line.  Our approach is consistent with Besley and Kanbur’s (1988) analysis of the 
poverty impact of a reallocation of food subsidies at the margin.  This approach is also 
similar to that of Bibi and Duclos (2007) or Son and Kakwani (2006).  In particular it 
                                                 
2 Within this setting, each person’s claims to available goods and services are limited by the amount of 
income obtainable by that person’s successful sale of something of value on the market.  Lindblom (2001) 
calls this type of interaction, the rule of quid pro quo.   5
relies on the logic underlying a measure of the pro-poorness of economic growth 
proposed by Essama-Nssah and Lambert (2006). 
  The outline of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 presents the evaluative 
framework.  It explains the computation of changes in individual welfare attributable to 
the tax reform, and the ranking of social states on the basis of poverty outcomes.  Section 
3 applies the method to data for Guinea.  Concluding remarks are presented in Section 4. 
 
2.  Evaluation Framework 
 
    According to Sen (1999), any evaluative approach is characterized by its 
informational basis.  This entails a distinction between the information required in 
passing judgments within the chosen approach and that which has no direct evaluative 
role.  Our approach is essentially welfarist to the extent that it focuses on both individual 
and social welfare. Policy evaluation therefore requires the identification of impact on 
individuals as well as the specification of an aggregation rule to translate individual 
outcomes into social impact. 
Individual Outcomes 
Assessing the impact of policies on individual welfare and poverty status requires 
an explicit linkage between policy instruments and the determinants of individual living 
standard.  In particular, commodity taxes affect prices at which such commodities are 
sold. We therefore need an expression of individual (or household) welfare as a function 
of relevant prices.  Under the simple assumption that the consumer has an exogenous 
budget x to spend on a set of m commodities at fixed prices, the indirect utility is the 
maximum level of utility attainable given the outlay and the prevailing prices.  This   6
function can be formally written as (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980): 
] ); ( [ max ) , ( x q p q u p x v
q
= ⋅ = , where q is an m-dimensional vector of quantities of 
commodities and p the corresponding vector of consumer prices.  We assume that 
producer prices are not affected by the reform.  They can therefore be normalized to unity 
so that we express the consumer price of commodity k as a function of the producer price 
and the applicable tax (or subsidy)
3 rate tk.  That is:  . ..., , 2 , 1 ; 1 m k t p k k = + =    
  We can invoke Roy’s identity to compute the welfare impact of a marginal 
change in the price of commodity k induced by a marginal change in the applicable tax.  
According to this identity, the Marshallian demand function of a commodity is equal to 
the negative of the first-order derivative of the indirect utility function, divided by the 
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This expression implies that dν*(x,p) = –qk(x,p)dpk measures the welfare loss (in 
monetary terms) induced by a marginal increase
4 (dtk ) in the price of commodity k.  In 
this setting, note that dpk = dtk . 
  To assess the poverty implications of this price change, we need to define a 
measure of poverty at the individual or household level (depending of the unit of 
analysis).  Let z be the poverty line and ψ(x|z) an indicator of poverty (or deprivation) for 
an individual with total level of expenditure (or real income) equal x.  Following 
Kakwani (1999), we assume that: (i) the poverty indicator is equal to zero when x is 
                                                 
3 In this context, a subsidy is considered a negative tax on the relevant commodity. 
4 A rise in a subsidy would be associated with a welfare gain.  Also, ν*(x,p) is equal to the indirect utility 
normalized by the marginal utility of income.   7
greater or equal to the poverty line; (ii) the indicator is a decreasing convex function of x, 
given z.  Thus   the first-order derivative with respect to x is negative, given z.  In other 
words,  . 0
) | (









  The observed demand functions are a consequence of optimal behavior.  Hence, 
the level of expenditure x represents the minimum required to attain utility ν*(x,p).  Thus 
when the price of commodity k increases by a small amount, the consumer faces a loss of 
real income dx = –qk(x,p)dpk . We compute the corresponding marginal poverty increase 
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In the case of a subsidy, the marginal reduction in poverty is equal to the absolute value 
of expression (2.2). 
Aggregation and Ranking 
  The ranking of potential tax options is based on the impact of the tax reform on 
the overall poverty.  We focus here on members of the class of additively separable 
poverty measures defined by the following expression, where f(x) stands for the density 
function of real income x within the population. 
  ∫ =
z
dx x f z x
0 ) ( ) | ( ψ θ          ( 2 . 3 )  
Members of this class are additively separable in the sense that the deprivation felt by an 
individual depends only on a fixed poverty line and the individual economic welfare not 
on the welfare experienced by others in society.  They include such poverty indices as the 
Foster Greer Thorbecke (1984) family and the Watts measure.  The Foster Greer and 
Thorbecke (FGT) family is characterized by the following deprivation function:   8
{}
α
α ψ ] 0 ), / 1 max[( ) | ( z x z x − = .  When α is equal to zero, one or two, equation (2.3) 
leads respectively to the headcount ratio (H), the normalized poverty deficit (or poverty 
gap), and the squared poverty gap. The deprivation function underlying the Watts index 
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Equations (2.2) and (2.3) imply that the change in overall poverty associated with 
a marginal increase in the price of commodity k is equal to: 
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It is more convenient to couch the analysis in terms of elasticity.  Thus, we write the price 
elasticity of poverty for commodity k as: 
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Furthermore, the price elasticity of real income with respect to commodity k is equal to 
the negative of the budget share of commodity k (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980).  
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This expression means that, when the price of commodity k increases by 1 percent, real 
income  x declines by an amount equal to the corresponding budget share, wk(x).   
Equation (2.5) is therefore equivalent to the following. 
  ∫ ′ − =
z
k k dx x f z x x xw




θ ϕ      ( 2 . 7 )  
This elasticity is positive for a price increase and negative for a price reduction.  It is a 
weighted sum of individual budget shares (interpreted as price elasticities of real   9
income
5).  Whether or not a change in the price of commodity k is favorable to the poor 
(i.e. pro-poor) depends on the distribution of these budget shares over the entire 
population. 
  We need a decision rule for declaring a price change pro-poor.  For our purpose, 
an increase (reduction) in the price of commodity k is considered pro-poor if it induces 
an absolute increase (reduction) in poverty smaller (greater) than it would in a benchmark 
case
6.  As a benchmark we select a situation where a one percent change in the price of k 
would have the same relative impact on real income x.  We construct such a hypothetical 
by assuming that everybody assigns the same proportion of real income, w0k, to the 
purchase of commodity k
7.  This constant budget share can be computed as the average 
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 where  mx represents the highest level of real income in the population.  The 
corresponding price elasticity of poverty is: 
∫ ′ − =
z k
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θ ϕ        ( 2 . 9 )  
Since budget shares do add up to unity, the price elasticity defined by equation (2.9) can 















k w w dx x f z x x w x
w






− = ∑ ∫ ∑
= =
, 
                                                 
5 Interestingly, this price elasticity is analogous to the growth elasticity of poverty proposed by Essama-
Nssah and Lambert (2006) in the context of measuring the pro-poorness of economic growth. 
6 The choice of a benchmark is analogous to selecting a level of significance in statistical analysis. 
7 This idea is similar to the use of a Lorenz curve to assess inequality.  Indeed, within the Lorenz 
framework, the amount of observed inequality is inferred from a comparison of the actual distribution of 
economic welfare (as represented by income or expenditure) with a hypothetical distribution where 
everybody would have equal share.   10
where ) ( ) (
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k  is the percentage change in poverty induced by a marginal 
increase in all prices (Son and Kakwani 2006). 
A 1 percent increase in the price of commodity k would increase poverty by θϕk 
under the observed distribution of budget shares, and by θϕ0k in the benchmark case.  To 
declare the price increase pro-poor one can make either an additive comparison or a 
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) ( = ω  is the budget share of commodity k at income level x normalized 
by the aggregate budget share.  The ratio measure of pro-poorness is thus a weighted 
average of normalized budget shares among the poor (i.e. along the distribution of real 
income up to the poverty line).  An increase in the price of k would be considered pro-
poor if this indicator is less than one.  In other words, an increase in the price of 
commodity k would hurt the poor less than the non-poor.  Commodities for which this 
indicator is greater than one are good candidates for subsidization. 
  It is instructive to consider the additive comparison based on the following 
measure. 
  ∫ − ′ − = − =
z
k k k k k dx x f w x w z x x
0 0 0 ) ( ] ) ( )[ | ( ) ( ) ( ψ ϕ ϕ θ θ π     (2.11) 
This additive measure of pro-poorness is a weighted sum of the deviation of budget 
shares for commodity k from their mean, up to the poverty line.  When this measure is   11
negative, an increase in the price of commodity k would be pro-poor (i.e. it would hurt 
the non-poor more than the poor).  In other words,  0 ) ( < θ π k .  A poverty-focused fiscal 
reform would not advocate a subsidy on such a commodity.  Expression (2.11) also 
reveals that  z x w x w k k < ∀ > 0 ) (  is sufficient for an increase in the price of commodity k 
to hurt the poor more than the non-poor, regardless of the poverty measure used among 
those defined in (2.3). 
We now consider expressions for the price elasticity and measures of pro-
poorness for specific poverty measures that we will use in the empirical section.  The 
headcount ratio is equal to the cumulative distribution function of x evaluated at the 
poverty line.  That is H=F(z).  The price elasticity of the headcount can be computed in 
terms of the equivalent variation in the poverty line as follows. 
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) ( = ϕ .   The corresponding ratio measure of pro-poorness is equal 
to: 
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While the additive measure of pro-poorness is equal to the following expression: 
] ) ( )[ ( ) ( 0k k k w z w z zf H − = π         ( 2 . 1 4 )  
When using the headcount ratio to assess the pro-poorness of a price change, expressions 
(2.13) and (2.14) make it clear that such a judgment is based only on the budget shares of 
individuals located at the poverty line.  This indicator does not use available information   12
efficiently to the extent that it does not take into account the pattern of consumption of 
commodity k among the poor. 
  For the Watts index of poverty, the price elasticity is equal to: 
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The corresponding additive measure of pro-poorness is: 
  [] ∫ − =
z
k k W k dx x f w x w
0 0 ) ( ) ( ) (θ π        ( 2 . 1 6 )  
Thus a reduction in the price of commodity k (e.g. a subsidy) would be pro-poor if the 
average budget share for the poor is greater than the overall average budget share.  That 
is:  ∫ >
z
k k w dx x f x w
H 0 0 ) ( ) (
1
.  Note that the multiplicative measure of pro-poorness for 
the Watts index is equal to: 
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 Generally,  when  α≥ 1, the price elasticity of poverty associated with members of 
the FGT family is equal to
8: 
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This expression leads to the following measures of pro-poorness: 
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θ ϕ .  This decomposition 
implies that the overall impact associated with the same change in all prices can simply be written as 
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and 
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The Social Cost of Public Funds 
 
In general, the concept of social cost of public funds establishes a relationship 
between the funds collected through taxation and the change in social welfare induced by 
the collection process.  In the context of our poverty-focused framework, the poverty cost 
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where R stands for government revenue from commodity taxation.  We refer to this 
indicator as the marginal poverty cost of public funds.  Given two commodities j and k 
such that λj(θ)<λk(θ), in the context of the design of a revenue-neutral tax reform, it 
would be socially desirable to increase the tax on j and reduce the tax on k by the same 
amount. 
  To make the expression of the marginal poverty cost of funds more explicit, we 
define the aggregate demand function for commodity k as  ∫ =
x m
k k dx x f x p q p Q
0 ) ( ) ; ( ) ( .  
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Thus, a small change in the tax rate of commodity k leads to the following change 
























MR        ( 2 . 2 3 )  
 
  Equations (2.4) and (2.23) and the fact that dtk=dpk imply that the marginal 
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  Following Ahmad and Stern (1987), the above expression may be transformed as 
follows.  First, multiply both the numerator and the denominator by the price of k.  
Second, multiply the second term of the denominator by the neutral element 
1=(pjQj/pjQj).  This two-step transformation allows the use of data on household 
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In other words, letting  ∫ =
x m
x dx x xf
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θ λ        (2.26) 
The parameter εjk stands for the cross-price elasticity between commodity j and 
commodity k.  Bibi and Duclos (2007) show that the marginal poverty cost of taxing 


























































γ   can be interpreted as the marginal efficiency cost of 
taxation.  It is an indicator of the extent of leakage from the tax base associated with 
adjustment in behavior by the tax payer in response to changes in the tax burden 
(Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2001).  This may be thought of as an incentive effect of the tax 
on commodity k.  Expression (2.26) reveals that the marginal social cost of public funds 
is a product of two components, one measuring the efficiency cost and the other is linked 
to the distributional characteristic of commodity k














                                                 
9 Bibi and Duclos (2007) present similar expressions and discuss necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
marginal tax reform to be both revenue neutral and poverty-reducing for all poverty measures satisfying 
some set of value judgments.  Also note that the distributional characteristic of a commodity depends on 
the covariance between the consumption of that commodity and social weights defined by the structure of 
the poverty measure underlying the evaluation.   16
3.  An Empirical Illustration 
 
We now use household level data for Guinea to illustrate the use of the above 
indicators to identify commodities or groups of commodities the taxation of which would 
be more or less (at the margin) desirable from the standpoint of poverty reduction.  The 
database is a nationally representative sample of 4,416 households from the 1994 
Integrated Household Survey. 
Table 3.1: A Poverty Profile for Guinea (1994) 
 
  Headcount Poverty Gap Squared Poverty Gap  Watts 
Conakry 6.70 1.30  0.38  1.56 
Other Urban  24.32  6.58  2.59  8.60 
Rural 52.52  17.77  7.86  24.08 
Guinea 40.27  13.19  5.75  17.80 
  Source: Author’s calculations (results in percentage) 
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Guinea is considered one of the poorest countries in Africa despite its rich 
endowment in agricultural, mineral and energy resources.  The United Nations Report of 
Human Development has, for the past decade, ranked this country last or near the bottom 
among some 174 countries.  In 1994, income poverty incidence was estimated at about 40 
percent based on a poverty line set at about US$300 per capita and per annum
10.  This is 
about 56 percent of the 1994 GDP per capita (US$532).  Table 3.1 shows a profile of 
income poverty in Guinea, as measured by members of the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke 
(FGT) family of poverty measures and the Watts index.  All measures indicate that 
poverty is essentially a rural phenomenon.  About 53 percent of the rural population lived 
in poverty in 1994.  The urban centers outside the capital city of Conakry represent the 
next poorest areas with poverty incidence estimated at 24 percent.  Poverty is lowest in 
the capital city, regardless of the measure used. 
Figure 3.1 provides a global picture of poverty for the whole country based on the 
FGT measures.  This is the so-called three I’s of poverty (TIP) curve of Jenkins and 
Lambert (1997)
11.  The curve shows graphically three dimensions of aggregate poverty as 
follows: (a) the length of the non-horizontal segment reveals incidence, (b) the height of 
the curve at any point on the horizontal segment represents intensity, and (c) the degree 
of concavity translates inequality among the poor. 
In January 2002, the Government of Guinea published a Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP) describing an integrated and participatory approach to fighting 
poverty.  The three pillars of this strategy are (Republic of Guinea 2002): (1) Boosting 
                                                 
10 In local currency (Guinean Francs) this was equivalent to GNF293,714. 
11 The curve is obtained by ranking individuals from the poorest to the richest and partially cumulating 
individual contributions to the overall poverty.  Individual contributions are based on the chosen 
deprivation function ψ(x|z).  The three I’s stand for (1) Incidence, (2) Intensity and (3) Inequality (among 
the poor).   18
economic growth; (2) Promoting efficient and equitable provision of basic services; and 
(3) Improving governance and building human capital. 
The strategy identifies two basic challenges in the area of fiscal management: 
revenue mobilization, and enhancing the efficiency of public expenditures.  Between 
1996 and 2000 central government revenues hovered around 10 percent of GDP while 
total expenditures ranged from 15 to 18 percent about (Republic of Guinea 2002). 
To address this fiscal challenge in a socially desirable way, the strategy seeks to 
expand the tax base while protecting the vulnerable segments of the population.  In 
particular, the government has decided to exempt from the value added tax (VAT
12) the 
following items considered basic necessities: rice, flour, edible oils, pharmaceuticals and 
school supplies.  The social desirability of this policy decision may be evaluated on the 
basis of the methodology discussed in this paper. 
Table 3.2 contains estimates of the distributional characteristic for 19 components 
of food expenditure, computed on the basis of the measure of pro-poorness defined by 
equation (2.10) for four poverty measures.  Given the limitations we noted about 
measures associated with the headcount ratio, we focus our attention on those based on 
the poverty gap, the squared poverty gap and the Watts index.  On the basis of these 
results, there are 11 food items or groups that might deserve special consideration in the 
context of marginal commodity tax reform.  These include palm oil, smoked fish, rice 
(both local and imported), sugar, cereals, roots, grains, vegetables, oils and sweets.  As 
the analytical framework revealed, the commodities for which the ratio measure of pro-
poorness is greater than one are those with higher budget shares for low-income 
                                                 
12 In Guinea, the VAT is assessed at a unique rate of 18 percent on the estimated value added to goods or 
services.   19
households.  Of the 11 food items identified, cereals, roots and grains have the highest 
value for the indicator. 
 
Table 3.2. Guinea (1994): Distributional Characteristics 
of Components of Food Expenditure 
  Headcount Poverty Gap Squared Poverty Gap  Watts 
Beef 0.00  0.65 0.56  0.61 
Palm Oil  0.00  1.22  1.16  1.19 
Bread 1.34  0.78  0.72  0.75 
Fresh Fish  0.00  0.53  0.45  0.49 
Smoked Fish  0.00  1.10  1.14  1.12 
Local Rice  7.91  1.33  1.30  1.30 
Imported Rice  135.94  1.17  1.23  1.30 
Sugar 0.28  1.10  1.07  1.09 
Cereals 2.34  1.57  1.57  1.57 
Roots 0.00  1.53  1.56  1.55 
Grains 0.82  1.56  1.61  1.59 
Fruits 0.00  0.99  0.91  0.95 
Vegetables 1.59  1.26  1.28  1.28 
Meats 2.10  0.83  0.76  0.79 
Livestock 0.00 0.94  0.95  0.95 
Beverages 0.00 0.57  0.47  0.52 
Oils 1.96  1.14  1.08  1.10 
Sweets 0.25  1.04  1.01  1.03 
Canned Food  0.00  0.42  0.37  0.40 
Source : Author’s calculations 
 
We also computed distributional characteristics for two subsets of non-food 
commodities.  The results are presented in tables 3.3 for health and education, and 3.4 for 
the rest of non-food expenditure components.  Only 5 expenditure components out of 21 
are associated with a value of the pro-poorness index greater than one for at least one 
poverty measure.  These components are: consultation fees, other health expenditures, 
PTA (contributions to parent-teacher association), rent and ceremonies.  The key point 
here is that most non-food expenditure components represent systematically a higher 
proportion of the budget of high-income households.  Theoretically, a subsidy on these 
products would favor the non-poor.  However, because expenditure on health and   20
education is key to human capital accumulation and hence poverty reduction, it may be 
worth investigating the feasibility of targeted subsidies in a broader context of cost 
recovery. 
Table 3.3. Guinea (1994): Distributional Characteristics of Components of Expenditure 
 on Health and Education. 
 
  Headcount Poverty Gap Squared Poverty Gap  Watts 
Consultation Fees  0.00  1.00  1.22  1.07 
Medical Test  0.00  0.34  0.23  0.30 
Hospitalization 0.00  0.37  0.19  0.29 
Pharmaceuticals 0.05  0.61  0.59  0.61 
Other Health  0.38  1.07  1.04  1.06 
School Fees  0.00  0.12  0.09  0.11 
PTA 0.00  0.96  1.05  1.01 
School Supplies  0.00  0.73  0.68  0.70 
Other Education  0.00  0.50  0.53  0.52 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Table 3.4  Guinea (1994):  Distributional Characteristics of Some Components of 
Non-Food Expenditure 
 
  Headcount Poverty Gap Squared Poverty Gap  Watts 
Tobacco 0.96  0.93  0.90  0.90 
Hygiene 0.65  0.72  0.68  0.70 
Clothing 0.43  0.95  0.90  0.92 
Personal Effects  0.00  0.74  0.70  0.72 
Rent 2.19  1.83  2.06  1.94 
Water 0.00  0.15  0.12  0.13 
Electricity 0.00  0.14  0.10 0.12 
Energy 0.87  1.01 0.99  1.01 
Transportation 0.00  0.26  0.26  0.26 
Recreation 0.00  0.34  0.29  0.31 
Communication 0.00  0.05  0.04  0.05 
Ceremonies 0.34 1.01  1.10  1.05 
  Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
  Social desirability does not necessarily entail feasibility.  There is a potential 
efficiency cost associated with taxation as socioeconomic agents are expected to adjust 
their optimal behavior in the face of a new configuration of incentives induced by a tax 
reform.  There could also be significant administrative costs associated with a finer 
differentiation of commodities for the sake of protecting the poor.  As noted earlier, the   21
concept of marginal social cost of taxation allows one to account for efficiency cost.  This 
requires information of price elasticity of demand.  Table 3.5 presents estimates of the 
marginal social cost associated with 16 food commodities for which we have estimates of 
price elasticity (see tables A.1 and A.2 in the annex).  The ranking of commodities 
depends on the value judgments underpinning the poverty measure used.  By and large, 
the commodities with the highest social cost tend to be the same as the ones identified on 
the basis of distributional characteristics.  FGT measures rank roots, grains, cereals, 
vegetables and local rice as commodities with highest marginal social cost.  To this list, 
the Watts index would add palm oil, smoked fish, oils and livestock products. 
 
 
Table 3.5: Guinea (1994): Marginal Social Cost for Some Components of Food Expenditure 
 
  Headcount Poverty Gap Squared Poverty Gap  Watts 
Beef 0.00  0.19  0.09  0.26 
Palm Oil  0.00  0.35  0.18  0.50 
Bread 0.85  0.23  0.12  0.33 
Fresh Fish  0.00  0.16  0.08  0.23 
Smoked Fish  0.00  0.31  0.18  0.47 
Local Rice  5.21  0.41  0.22  0.60 
Cereals 1.42  0.44  0.24  0.66 
Roots 0.00  0.49  0.27  0.73 
Grains 0.53  0.47  0.27 0.72 
Fruits 0.00  0.31  0.15  0.44 
Vegetables 1.08  0.40  0.22  0.60 
Meats 1.40  0.26  0.13  0.37 
Livestock 0.00  0.31  0.17  0.47 
Beverages 0.00  0.21  0.09  0.28 
Oils 1.32  0.36  0.19  0.51 
Sweets 0.17  0.33  0.18 0.49 
Source : Author’s calculations 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
The perspective of development as empowerment has prompted the international 
community to declare poverty eradication a basic objective of development, hence a 
benchmark measure of performance of development interventions.  In the pursuit of this 
fundamental policy objective, many developing countries rely heavily on indirect taxes   22
on goods and non-factor services to finance development interventions.  This paper 
therefore seeks to demonstrate how to conduct a poverty-focused evaluation of public 
policy on the basis of the value judgments underlying members of the additively 
separable class of poverty measures. 
In the particular case of commodity taxation, the evaluation criterion hinges on 
both the price elasticity of the poverty measure used and the consumption pattern for each 
commodity.  To assess whether a price change for a given commodity induced by an 
indirect tax reform is favorable to the poor, the observed pattern of consumption of that 
commodity is compared to a benchmark case of equal budget shares across individuals 
(or households).  Additive comparison leads to an indicator that is a weighted sum of the 
deviation of budget shares for commodity k from the aggregate share, up to the poverty 
line.  The weights depend of the chosen poverty measure. 
The methodology developed in the paper confirms the basic intuition that a 
progressive commodity tax has a higher rate on goods that constitute a higher proportion 
of the budgets of high-income individuals.  An application of this methodology to survey 
data for Guinea shows that it is mostly components of food expenditure (particularly 
cereals, grains and roots) that deserve exemption from VAT.  Our analysis also shows 
that health and education expenditures (like other non-food items) represent a higher 
proportion of the budget of high-income households.  Given the importance of these 
services for the accumulation of human capital, it is desirable to implement a program of 
targeted subsidies in a broader context of cost recovery.  The feasibility of these policy 
options deserves further investigation.   23
 
Annex: Price Elasticities Used in the Computation of Marginal Cost of Funds 
 
Table A.1.  Guinea (1994): Cross Price Elasticities for Six Food Items. 
 
 
  Beef  Palm Oil Bread  Fresh Fish Smoked Fish Local rice
Beef -0.324  -0.019  -0.021  -0.014  -0.009  -0.096 
Palm Oil  -0.013  -0.231  -0.015  -0.010  -0.006  -0.068 
Bread -0.027  -0.024  -0.423  -0.017  -0.012  -0.123 
Fresh Fish  -0.026  -0.036  -0.040  -0.616  -0.017  -0.183 
Smoked Fish -0.005  -0.011  -0.012  -0.008  -0.183  -0.055 
Local Rice  -0.135  -0.026  -0.030  -0.019  -0.013  -0.568 
 
Source : Setym International (1995) 
 
 
Table A2. Guinea (1994) :  Cross Price Elasticities for Groups of Food Items. 
 
  1 2 3  4 5 6  7  8 9  10 
1.Cereals  -0.125 -0.018 -0.010  -0.025  -0.029 -0.015 0.000  -0.003  -0.012 -0.004 
2.Roots  -0.296 -0.214 -0.035  -0.091  -0.104 -0.055 -0.001  -0.009  -0.043 -0.015 
3.Grains  -0.215 -0.046 -0.135  -0.066  -0.076 -0.040 -0.001  -0.007  -0.031 -0.011 
4.Fruits  -0.249 -0.053 -0.030  -0.203  -0.088 -0.046 -0.001  -0.008  -0.036 -0.013 
5.Vegetables  -0.290 -0.062 -0.035  -0.089  -0.250 -0.054 -0.001  -0.009  -0.042 -0.015 
6.Meats  -0.267 -0.057 -0.032  -0.082  -0.094 -0.185 -0.001  -0.009  -0.038 -0.014 
7.Livestock 
Products 
-0.369 -0.078 -0.044  -0.113  -0.130 -0.068 -0.189  -0.012  -0.053 -0.019 
8.Drinks   -0.530 -0.113 -0.064  -0.162  -0.186 -0.098 -0.002  -0.288  -0.076 -0.027 
9.Oils  -0.279 -0.059 -0.033  -0.085  -0.098 -0.052 -0.001  -0.009  -0.183 -0.014 
10.Sweets  -0.297 -0.063 -0.036  -0.091  -0.104 -0.055 -0.001  -0.010  -0.043 -0.167 
 
 
Source : Setym International (1995)   24
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